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We compare supports A ↑ B (i.e. p r (B |A)>
p r (B)) with conditionals A → B and
prove that the basic properties of supports
are exactly the opposite to those of
conditionals.
Keywords: probable conditionals
We are interested in probable
conditionals which could be p r (A→ B)
“probability of, B if A” or p r (B |A)
“probability of B, if A”.
Lewis famously proved that they are not
the same; what he assumes about the
conditionals is evident from his proof,
(cf. Lewis pp. 297-230):
If p r (A → B) is the same as p r (B |A)
then
p r (B |A)
= p r (A→ B)
= p r (A→ B |B)p r (B)
+ p r (A→ B | −B)p r (−B)
= p r (B→ (A→ B))p r (B)
+ p r (−B→ (A→ B))p r (−B)
= 1 p r (B)
+ p r ((−B&A)→ B)p r (−B)
= 1 p r (B)
+ p r (B | −B&A)p r (−B)
= 1 p r (B)+ 0 p r (−B)
= p r (B)
Hence, for every A and every B we
have p r (B |A) = p r (B) and this is
a contradiction. The whole point
is that p r (B → −B) = p r (−B)
could be positive, whereas p r (−B |B)
is necessarily zero.
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For classical conditional→ we prove the same (even more elementary):
p r (A→ B) = p r (−A∨B)
= p r (−A∨AB)
= p r (−A)+ p r (AB)
= p r (−A)+ p r (A)p r (B |A)
= 1− x + xc ,
where x = p r (A) and c = p r (B |A). Hence p r (A→ B) = p r (B |A), i.e. 1−x+xc =
c , only if p r (A) = x = 1 or p r (B |A) = c = 1, i.e. if p r (A→ B) = p r (B |A) = 1.
Yet more elementary than that, take S = E → T = If “it is even on the dice”,
then “it is two on the dice”. Then p r (−(E → T )) = p r (even & not two) = 1/3, i.e.
p r (E → T ) = 2/3, but p r (T |E) = 1/3.
As a matter of fact, it is easy to prove that (for classical conditional→)
p r (A→ B)≥ p r (B |A) for every A and B :
p r (A→ B) = p r (−(A(−B)))
= 1− p r (A(−B))
p r (B |A) = p r (BA)/p r (A)
= (p r (A)− p r (A(−B)))/p r (A)
= 1− p r (A(−B))/p r (A)
But p r (A(−B)) ≤ p r (A(−B))/p r (A) (because p r (A) ≤ 1) and then
1− p r (A(−B))≥ 1− p r (A(−B))/p r (A) i.e. p r (A→ B)≥ p r (B |A), which was to
be proved.
It also fallows that p r (A→ B) = p r (B |A) only if p r (A) = 1 or p r (A(−B)) = 0 i.e.
p r (−(A(−B))) = 1 i.e. p r (A→ B) = 1 (in accordance with what we have already
proved).
Another kind of probable conditional is A ↑ B , which means “A makes B more
probable” (“A supports B”) and which is defined as p r (B |A)> p r (B). We could also
define A ↓ B , which means “A makes B less probable” (“A subverts B”) as p r (B |A)<
p r (B). The independence relation A⊥B , is defined as p r (B |A) = p r (B).
For lot of people it is tempting to transfer the properties of conditionals to properties
of supports. This is quite a common error.
People think: “if A supports B and B supports C , then A supports C ” (i.e. they
think of “supports” as transitive). Confronted with a concrete counterexample:
A =“having white hair”, B =“being over 50”, C = “being completely bald”, they
change their minds.
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People also think: “If A supports C and B supports C , then their conjunction does
so even more”. Confronted with a concrete counterexample: A crime is committed
by two men, one in a red jacket another in a black coat. A= “first witness recognized
the suspect as the man in the red jacket“, B = “second witness recognized the (same)
suspect as the man in the black coat”, C = “the suspect is guilty“, they change their
minds. There are other concrete counterexamples in ch. 6. of Carnap’s Logical
Foundations of Probability.
It seems that people do not err in concrete contexts and do err in abstract contexts.
There is a lot of psyhological research on this topic. Perhaps the most famous is
the Wason selection task (cf. Wason). People have a hard time solving it in abstract
contexts but can usually solve it correctly in concrete contexts, in particular when
the concrete context is policing a social rule (cf. Cosmides, Tooby). This is the
reason that an abstract analysis of supports ↑ (compared to conditionals→) could
be of some interest.
The basic properties of conditionals are:
(1) A→ B ,B→C ⇒A→C is valid (transitivity)
(2) A→ B⇒ B→A is not valid (converse fallacy)
(3) A→ B⇒−B→−A is valid (contraposition)
(4) A→ B⇒−A→−B is not valid (inverse fallacy)
(5) C →A,C → B⇒C →A&B is valid (conjunction introduction)
(6) C →A(C → B)⇒C →A∨B is valid (disjunction introduction)
(7) A→C (B→C )⇒A&B→C is valid (conjunction elimination)
(8) A→C ,B→C ⇒A∨B→C is valid (disjunction elimination)
The corresponding properties of A ↑ B , except (3), are exactly the opposite:
(i) Property (2) is valid for ↑ (the relation is symmetrical).
(ii) Property (4) is valid for ↑.
(iii) Property (1) is not valid for ↑ (the relation is not transitive).
(iv) Properties (5), (6), (7) and (8) are not valid for ↑.
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It is easy to prove that:
(i) The symmetry of ↑ and ↓ follows from p r (A|B)p r (B) = p r (B |A)p r (A).
Namely, if B ↑ A i.e. p r (A|B) > p r (A) but it is not the case that A ↑ B
i.e. p r (B |A)≤ p r (B) then p r (A|B)p r (B)> p r (B |A)p r (A) and we have a
contradiction with p r (A|B)p r (B) = p r (B |A)p r (A).
Similarly, if B ↓A i.e. p r (A|B)< p r (A) but it is not the case that A ↓ B i.e.
p r (B |A)≥ p r (B) then p r (A|B)p r (B)< p r (B |A)p r (A) and we again have
a contradiction with p r (A|B)p r (B) = p r (B |A)p r (A).
(ii) It is easy to prove that A ↑ B iff A ↓ −B and A ↓ B iff A ↑ −B .
From A ↑ B i.e. p r (B |A)> p r (B), it follows that 1− p r (B |A)< 1− p r (B)
i.e. p r (−B |A)< p r (−B) i.e. A ↓ −B .
From A ↓ B i.e. p r (B |A)< p r (B), it follows that 1− p r (B |A)> 1− p r (B)
i.e. p r (−B |A)> p r (−B) i. e. A ↑ −B .
Now, using (i), it is easy to prove (4) for ↑ and ↓:
A ↑ B iff A ↓ −B iff −B ↓A iff −B ↑ −A iff −A ↑ −B
A ↓ B iff A ↑ −B iff −B ↑A iff −B ↓ −A iff −A ↓ −B










From the above figure it follows that p r (B |A) = 1 and p r (B) = 1/2 i.e.
A ↑ B . Similarly, p r (C/B) = 2/3 and p r (C ) = 1/3 i.e. B ↑ C . But
p r (C/A) = 0 and p r (C ) = 1/3 i.e. A ↓C . Hence, ↑ is not transitive. (It is
easy to construct similar examples which prove the nontransitivity of ↓ and
⊥.)
(iv) That (5) - (8) are not valid for ↑ follows from the following example:
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From the above figure it follows that p r (A|C ) = 3/5 and p r (A) = 1/2
i.e. C ↑ A. Similarly, p r (B |C ) = 3/5 and p r (B) = 1/2 i.e. C ↑ B . But
p r (A&B |C ) = 1/5 and p r (A&B) = 3/10 i.e. C ↓ (A&B). This proves that
(5) is not valid for ↑.
It also follows that p r (C |A) = 3/5 and p r (C ) = 1/2 i.e. A ↑C . (Similarly,
p r (C |B) = 3/5 and p r (C ) = 1/2 i.e. B ↑ C .) But p r (C |A&B) = 1/3 and
p r (A&B) = 1/2 i.e. (A&B) ↓C . This proves that (7) is not valid for ↑.
From nonvalidity of (5) for ↑, it follows that
−C ↑ −A,−C ↑ −B⇒−C ↑ (−A&−B)
is not valid. Then it follows from (ii) that C ↑A,C ↑ B⇒C ↑ −(−A&−B)
is not valid. Hence, C ↑ A,C ↑ B ⇒ C ↑ (A∨ B) is not valid. This proves
that (6) is not valid for ↑.
From the above proof concerning (7) for ↑, it follows that
−C ↑ −A,−C ↑ −B⇒−C ↑ (−A∨−B)
is not valid. Then it follows from (ii) that C ↑A, C ↑ B⇒C ↑ −(−A∨−B)
is not valid. Hence, C ↑ A, C ↑ B ⇒ C ↑ (A&B) is not valid. This proves
that (8) is not valid for ↑.
(It is easy to construct similar examples which prove that (5) - (8) are not valid
for ↓ and ⊥.)
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